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Protecting Does and Outing Mobsters: Recalibrating Anonymity 
Standards in Revenge Porn Proceedings 
ELIZABETH BROWN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Nonconsensual porn, popularly known as revenge porn1, is becoming an 
epidemic without an effective and coherent legal remedy. As its name suggests, it 
is the posting or distribution of sexually explicit images without the consent of the 
person purportedly represented in those images, sometimes by anonymous 
sources. In recent years, both the incidence of its distribution and the severity of 
its consequences have risen dramatically. A recent study suggests that one in eight 
social media users has been a victim of nonconsensual porn, and that women are 
1.7 times more likely to be targeted than men.2 According to a 2016 report, one in 
twenty-five U.S. residents have either been victims of nonconsensual porn or have 
been threatened with posting sensitive images without their consent.3 That 
number rises to one in eight for women between the ages of 15 and 29.4 
Nonconsensual porn victims may suffer a wide range of harms, including 
professional, reputational and economic harms that are often impossible to 
remedy in full because the offensive images can never be permanently erased.  In 
November 2017, New York City passed a new nonconsensual porn law.5 In doing 
so, it joined a national trend of new regulations concerning nonconsensual porn.6  
This increase reflects a growing concern about nonconsensual porn but these new 
laws do not go far enough in providing an effective recourse for its victims. 
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 1.  Professors Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley advocate for replacing the term “revenge porn” 
with the term “image-based sexual abuse.” See CLARE MCGLYNN & ERIKA RACKLEY, SUBMISSION ON THE 
ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR AND SEXUAL HARM (SCOTLAND) BILL 2015, (ABSH 3) § 3 (Nov. 2015) 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/93304.aspx; Clare McGlynn 
& Erika Rackley, Not Porn, but Abuse: Let’s Call it Image-Based Sexual Abuse, EVERYDAY VICTIM BLAMING 
(Mar. 9, 2016), http://everydayvictimblaming.com/media-complaints/not-revenge-porn-but-abuse-
lets-call-it-image-based-sexual-abuse-by-%e2%80%8fmcglynnclare-erikarackley/. 
 2.  Nonconsensual Porn: A Common Offense, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE (June 12, 
2017),https://www.cybercivilrights.org/2017-natl-ncp-research-results/.  Because women are 
significantly more likely to be victims of NCP, I use the feminine pronoun when referring to NCP 
victims in this article even though both men and women may be targets. 
 3.  AMANDA LENHART ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE SHARING: 
ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF REVENGE PORN 3 (2016). 
 4.  Id. at 5. 
 5.  Sara Ashley O’Brien, Revenge Porn Will Soon Be a Crime in New York City, CNN MONEY: TECH 
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/16/technology/nyc-revenge-porn-bill/index.html. 
 6.  See infra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.  
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While new laws are being enacted with greater urgency at the state and local 
levels, these new laws are lacking in two specific and critical ways. First, they do 
too little to shield victims from the retaliation and reprisals that often accompany 
nonconsensual porn claims. Victims may be unwilling to take advantage of their 
new legal recourses because they may reasonably fear the additional harassment 
that may result from exposing their identity and personal information. At the same 
time, victims may be unwilling or unable to meet the higher burden involved in 
suing anonymously, since current procedural standards for suing 
pseudonymously generally require a would-be “Plaintiff Doe” to meet a higher 
evidentiary standard than she would if she used her real name. 
The second challenge is that many putative nonconsensual porn defendants 
are anonymous, and it is more difficult and more expensive to sue defendants 
whose real identity is unknown. This is partly because the procedural standards 
for unmasking anonymous defendants are unreasonably cumbersome, and partly 
because internet content providers (ICPs), including social media companies like 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter, have little incentive to disclose users’ real 
identities voluntarily. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides a safe 
harbor for them that works against the interests of victims and law enforcement, 
and should be reevaluated. 
Both the challenge of hesitant plaintiffs/complainants and the challenge of 
identifying anonymous defendants can be resolved by recalibrating the extent to 
which anonymity is tolerated in nonconsensual porn cases. This article argues that 
traditional preferences for anonymity should be reexamined in light of the 
pervasive and permanent damages nonconsensual porn causes and the difficulty 
of framing these damages in the strictly economic terms most familiar to courts.  
Anonymity is considered a right on social media, but a privilege in the justice 
system. In the context of revenge porn, it may be time to flip those standards. 
This article joins a growing discussion of the wisdom of current standards for 
pseudonymous plaintiffs and augments it by focusing on the unique 
circumstances of revenge porn victims. It comparatively evaluates public and 
private remedies in order to develop recommendations for more effective and 
protective remedies for victims of nonconsensual porn, and makes three specific 
recommendations. The first is to revise and standardize the conditions under 
which a victim may shield her identity and personal information when alleging 
nonconsensual porn, either as a plaintiff in a civil case or in a criminal prosecution 
on her behalf.  The second is to refine, and in some cases relax, the current 
standards for compelling ICPs to disclose the names of anonymous alleged 
nonconsensual porn perpetrators. The third is to expand potential liability for ICPs 
when they fail to respond reasonably once they are put on notice that they may be 
facilitating nonconsensual porn. 
The changing nature of hiring practices and practical permanence of social 
media personae should inform judicial decisions about balancing the interests of 
the plaintiff, the defendant, the public, and the ICPs facilitating this harm. In light 
of the weak protections current public laws and private policies offer victims of 
nonconsensual porn, other options should be considered. As one scholar wrote in 
another context, “[t]o preserve constitutional rights and access to justice, legal 
systems must provide well-functioning mechanisms to check against 
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intimidation—especially when fear generated by past reprisals may be keeping 
people out of court.”7 In the context of nonconsensual porn, victims require more 
anonymity and accused perpetrators require less. As for social media companies, 
it is a relatively small but important step to require them by law to engage in the 
kind of curbing efforts they have begun to take on voluntarily. 
I. THE UNIQUE PROLIFERATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN 
MANDATE RECONSIDERING PRIVACY FOR PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 
Nonconsensual porn is an often permanently damaging form of privacy 
invasion that affects a growing number of internet users, more often women than 
men. Under the name “revenge porn,” it has grabbed headlines in recent years. In 
early 2017, the nonconsensual posting of sexually explicit photos of female 
Marines without their consent on the Marines United Facebook page created a 
scandal and prompted an investigation by the Pentagon.8  Later in 2017, Rob 
Kardashian posted sexually explicit photographs of his ex-girlfriend, Blac Chyna, 
on Instagram, apparently in anger over her affair with another man.9 When 
Instagram took them down, Kardashian posted other nonconsensual porn images 
of Chyna on Twitter.10 Another minor celebrity, Mischa Barton, sued two men in 
2017 in an effort to block their unauthorized distribution of nude photos and 
videos of her.11 
Most victims of nonconsensual porn, of course, are not nearly as famous and 
would prefer to keep it that way. In fact, a critical harm of nonconsensual porn is 
the unwanted exposure of a victim’s identity and personal details, along with her 
name, promulgated to the public at large, sent specifically to her friends, family, 
and/or co-workers.12 
While headline stories involving celebrities like Kardashian and Barton 
involved in nonconsensual porn litigation have brought a certain amount of 
attention to the issue, legal solutions are lagging behind. The unique nature of 
nonconsensual porn compared with other torts makes it necessary to reconsider 
the unreasonably high burden courts have placed both on plaintiffs who want to 
sue pseudonymously and plaintiffs who try to unmask anonymous defendants in 




 7.  Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response to 
Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 440 (2013). 
 8.  Bill Chappell, Sharing of Nude Photos of Female Marines Online Prompts Pentagon Investigation, 
NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Mar. 6, 2017, 8:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/03/06/5187 
67235/sharing-of-nude-photos-of-female-marines-prompts-pentagon-investigation. 
 9.  Edgar Alvarez, Rob Kardashian’s Revenge Porn is Social Media’s Latest Headache, ENGADGET (July 
11, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/07/11/rob-kardashian-blac-chyna-revenge-porn/. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Mischa Barton Reaches Settlement in Revenge-Porn Case, CBS LOS ANGELES (June 5, 2017, 4:19 
PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/06/05/mischa-barton-revenge-porn/.   
 12.  See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text.  
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A. Nonconsensual Pornography Is Increasingly Pervasive 
Nonconsensual porn is a form of digital sexual harassment and a 
turbocharged invasion of physical and sexual privacy.13 It is sometimes defined as 
a sex crime and sometimes as a basis for civil liability.14 Nonconsensual porn is 
generally defined as the distribution of images of a fully or partially naked person, 
purporting to be of the victim without the victim’s consent, without necessarily 
having a specific motivation to harm.15 Revenge porn differs from nonconsensual 
porn, in that it assumes a motive to harass, disturb, or otherwise intentionally 
harm the victim.16 
In one manifestation of nonconsensual porn, sexually explicit photos of a 
victim are distributed without the victim’s consent, sometimes to the victim’s 
friends, family, and co-workers.17 In some cases, the photos were taken privately, 
or were derived from webcams switched on without the subject’s knowledge.18 In 
other cases, the images are created by photoshopping a victim’s head onto 
someone else’s nude body, and the photo purports to be a naked image of the 
victim.19 One of the most damaging aspects of nonconsensual porn cases is the 
frequency with which personal information such as home and email addresses are 
posted alongside the nude images. This practice, called doxing or doxxing, is a 
common feature in nonconsensual porn. According to one source, personal 
identifying information is posted with nonconsensual porn images nearly sixty 
percent of the time.20 The nonconsensual porn images pop up in internet searches 
of the victim’s name, sometimes causing victims to lose their jobs or to have 
difficulty applying for jobs because of the results that come up when employers or 
potential employers search for their names online.21 
Nonconsensual porn images can spread across the internet easily. A poster 
can disseminate an image instantaneously, and that image may dominate search 
engine results for the victim within days.22 This is exacerbated by thousands of 
 
 13.  See Adrienne N. Kitchen, Note, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How a Law Protecting 
Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 292 (2015). 
 14.  See Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight Against Revenge Porn, 
TIME: SOCIETY (June 13, 2017), http://time.com/4811561/revenge-porn/. 
 15.  See Nonconsensual Porn: A Common Offense supra note 2. 
 16.  Alter, supra note 14. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  There is, effectively, a minor industry in photoshopping one person’s head onto another 
person’s naked body, including for the purposes of revenge porn. See Kashmira Gander, The People Who 
Photoshop Friends and Family Onto Porn, INDEPENDENT: INDY/LOVE (Oct. 13, 2016, 9:30 AM) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/porn-photoshopping-4chan-family-friends-
superimposed-into-sex-scenes-world-a7358706.html. 
 20.  What Makes an Effective Revenge Porn Law?, C.A.GOLDBERG, http://www.cagoldberglaw.com 
/what-makes-an-effective-revenge-porn-law/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018). 
 21.  Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites For Posting Photos They Didn’t 
Consent To, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_
taking_on_revenge_porn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c. 
 22.  MARY ANNE FRANKS, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, DRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE “REVENGE 
PORN” LAW: A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS2 (Aug. 2015) https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Guide-for-Legislators-9.16.pdf. 
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websites which are dedicated to revenge porn.23 The images are further spread by 
what some scholars have called an “amplification effect,” in which mobs of people 
compete with each other to see who can create the most damaging images or other 
harassment of the victim.24 The “amplification effect” refers to the subsequent 
reposting and sharing of the initial post, which is often done by groups competing 
“to outdo each other” and “be the most offensive, the most abusive.”25 As a result 
of this competition, the initial post quickly spreads in reach and grows in offensive 
content, with subsequent posters adding sexual slurs and personal information 
about the victim. The number of viewers increases exponentially as it spreads. The 
victim typically only has a legal remedy against the initial poster, and not against 
the legion of re-posters.26 Internet archiving makes this worse, in that the harmful 
images and comments can stay online, and come up in searches, indefinitely. 
Victims of nonconsensual porn often have no definitive measure of how widely 
their private images have spread. 
Internet content providers, including social media sites such as Facebook, are 
struggling to deal with the viral spread of revenge porn. Documents leaked to the 
media suggested that Facebook had to assess almost 54,000 cases of reported 
revenge porn in a single month.27  Because Facebook relies on user reports to flag 
instances of revenge porn, the number of potential revenge porn postings could 
be higher.28 Facebook is trying to prevent users from posting some explicit content 
by using “image-matching” software, but claims to have trouble distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable material.29 Facebook is also adapting new 
and somewhat controversial technologies for flagging and removing 
nonconsensual porn.30 
The private nature, irreversible harms and online amplification of 
nonconsensual porn make it unlike other crimes. Kara Jefts, an academic and art 
historian at a Chicago university, became a victim of nonconsensual porn when 
she ended a long-term relationship with a boyfriend.31 Soon after the split, he 
posted sexually explicit images taken from their Skype conversations online to 
Facebook, together with violent threats against Jefts.32 These images were emailed 
to Jefts’ friends and family and uploaded to websites aimed at exposing the 
sexually transmitted diseases of individuals, with misinformation about Jefts’ 
 
 23.  Id.(noting that as many as 3,000 websites feature revenge porn); Dylan Love, It Will Be Hard to 
Stop the Rise of Revenge Porn, BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA: TECH INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2013, 11:00 am) 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/revenge-porn-2013-2. 
 24.  Apeksha Vora, Note, Into the Shadows: Examining Judicial Language in Revenge Porn Cases, 18 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 230 (2017). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.at 231. 
 27.  Nick Hopkins & Olivia Solon, Facebook Flooded With ‘Sextortion’ and ‘Revenge Porn’, Files Reveal, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2017, 9:52 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/facebook-
flooded-with-sextortion-and-revenge-porn-files-reveal. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See discussion infra Section IV(B). 
 31.  Alter, supra note 14.  
 32.  Id.   
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sexual past.33 Internet searches of Jefts’ name were subsequently dominated by 
information about Jefts’ status as a victim, causing irreversible damage to her 
personal and professional reputation.34  “I have to accept at this point that it’s 
going to continue to follow me,” she told Time magazine.35 “It’s kind of like having 
an incurable disease.”36 
Nonconsensual porn is one of many harms perpetuated in part by the online 
environment.  More than ninety percent of internet users agree that there is 
something about the online environment that allows people to be more critical of 
each other,37 often in dangerous ways. According to a study by the Pew Research 
Center, a full seventy-three percent of adults have seen someone else be harassed 
online and forty percent have experienced harassment online themselves.38 Of 
course, not all harassment is equally severe. The study differentiated between less 
severe harassment, which includes name-calling and more common annoying 
behaviors, and more severe harassment, which includes physical threats, 
sustained harassment over time, and sexual harassment.39  Of those who had been 
harassed online, the survey found that forty-five percent of them, or eighteen 
percent of all internet users, experienced the more severe form of harassment.40 
Young women between the ages of 18 and 24 experience stalking and online 
sexual harassment at “disproportionately high levels,” according to the study.41 Of 
these women, twenty-six percent report having been stalked, twenty-five percent 
report having been sexually harassed, and twenty-three percent of them reported 
having been physically threatened.42 Social media is a particularly risky 
environment in this context.  Two-thirds of internet users surveyed said that their 
most recent incidence of harassment occurred on a social networking website or 
app.43 
Similarly, women are more vulnerable to the use of nonconsensual porn than 
men. Estimates of the percentage of revenge porn victims who are female range 
from sixty to seventy percent, on the low end, to more than ninety percent.44 In the 
first nationwide study of nonconsensual porn, women were “significantly more 
likely” (about 1.7 times as likely) to have been subject to nonconsensual 
 
 33.  Id.   
 34.  Id. An internet search of “Kara Jefts” conducted on November 16, 2017 returned information 
about Ms. Jefts’ experience as a victim of revenge porn as well as professional information about her. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER: INTERNET & TECH REPORT, ONLINE HARASSMENT 8 (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf.  
 38.  Id. at 2. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 3. 
 42.  Id.at 3–4. 
 43.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 37, at 5–6. The survey distinguished social media websites 
and apps from dating websites and apps.  
 44.  See, e.g., Eaton, infra note 45, at 13 (noting that women are 1.5 times more likely to report being 
victims than men), Citron, infra note 55, at 17 (noting a study finding that ninety percent of victims 
were women).  
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distribution of their naked images or threatened with such distribution than men.45  
Nearly sixteen percent of all women participating in the study reported having 
been victimized or threatened, compared with just over nine percent of men.46 
Women were even more likely than men to experience threats of nonconsensual 
porn distribution than men, with 6.6% of women reporting threats compared with 
only 2.6% of men.47 
While attracting scholarly attention, nonconsensual porn is also subject to the 
subtle marginalization of crimes with predominantly female victims. “The 
trivialization of women’s harms is not new,” writes Apeksha Vora in an article 
examining what she describes as the trivializing languages judges use to describe 
the harm in revenge porn opinions.48 “[S]ociety often discounts harms that 
disproportionately affect women, as is seen most clearly in the historical treatment 
of rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment in the workplace.”49  Given the 
popular misconception that there is a right to be anonymous on the internet, the 
concerns of nonconsensual porn victims may suffer even more in comparison. 
In addition to the psychological, economic, and professional damages 
individual victims suffer, nonconsensual porn also hurts society. When the victims 
are people who already feel marginalized by social discourse, being harassed 
online makes them even less likely to participate in online dialogues. At least one 
study suggests that women, people of color, lesbians, gays and bisexuals already 
are more likely to censor themselves online than heterosexual white men because 
they have a greater fear of consequent online harassment.50 As a result, social 
discourse overall becomes less diverse and skews in favor of those who feel more 
powerful and privileged. This is a serious loss, although the impact is difficult to 
quantify.  Limiting the scope of people who feel able to participate fully in social 
discourse risks creating a segment of the population that is “chronically dogged 
by a spoiled social identity, and a much larger class of people who know that they 
could be subjected to such treatment without hope of redress.”51 This outcome 
would run “directly afoul of the ideal of a regime that allows for confidence, 
empowerment, and agency in the forum of public debate.”52  The consequences of 
nonconsensual porn, therefore, are dangerous for a free and open society as a 
whole. 
 
 45.  ASIA A. EATON ET AL., CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF 
NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION 12 (2017), https://www.cybercivilrights. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 14. 
 48.  Vora, supra note 24, at 248.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  AMANDA LENHART ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST.ONLINE HARASSMENT, DIGITAL 
ABUSE AND CYBERSTALKING IN AMERICA 53 (Nov. 21, 2016). 
 51.  Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 
663 (2016). 
 52.  Ashton Cooke, Note, The Right to Post: How North Carolina’s Revenge Porn Statute Can Escape 
Running Afoul of the First Amendment Post-Bishop, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 472, 484 (2017). 
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B. Revenge Porn Causes Extensive and Often Irremediable Damages 
The harm inflicted by the viral spread of nonconsensual porn may include 
psychological, economic and reputational damages that are qualitatively different 
from traditional tort damages, particularly in their permanence. These damages 
may surprise legal scholars unfamiliar with the unique dynamics of 
nonconsensual porn. In fact, the intractability of harm caused by nonconsensual 
porn would be all but unrecognizable to tort law commentators in the mid-
twentieth century. Now, approximately seventy-five percent of all Americans use 
the internet.53 As more social and economic aspects of our lives move online, the 
potential damage caused by these kinds of online comments and postings becomes 
more extreme and inescapable. 
Nonconsensual porn in particular can cause damage that is severe, pervasive, 
and often nearly impossible to remedy completely.  Victims are “frequently 
threatened with sexual assault, stalked, harassed, fired from jobs, and forced to 
change schools.”54  False comments, doctored images, and images distributed 
without consent can make victims feel powerless and depressed.  Some receive 
death threats. Others are forced to relocate.55 
In one example, a victim who wanted to remain anonymous reported that she 
began to suffer the effects of nonconsensual porn posted by her ex-husband, whom 
she divorced in 2009.56  Three years later, she was working for a Fortune 500 
company when she started receiving hundreds of text messages and friend 
requests from people she did not know.57 She alleges that her ex-husband posted 
an intimate photo he took of her on their wedding night on a public forum together 
with pictures of her daughter, her workplace, and her email address.58 Men began 
to call her on her company’s customer service line, trying to extort money and 
threatening her family.59 She spent $7,500 in an effort to remove the pictures, but 
they were continually reposted on different websites.60 The FBI were unable to 
help her effectively until her state passed a nonconsensual porn law in 2015, under 
which her ex-husband was arrested, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to prison 
time.61 Despite his conviction, she still received harassing messages from strangers 
on Facebook.62 
Negative online comments and images can have devastating professional 
consequences.  This is increasingly so, given that employers regularly conduct 
 
 53.  Internet Users (per 100 People), UNDATA, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=WDI&f=Indicator_
Code%3aIT.NET.USER.P2%3bCountry_Code%3aUSA&c=2,4,5&s=Country_Name:asc,Year:desc&v=1 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 54.  Franks, supra note 22, at 2.  
 55.  DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 6-7 (2014) [hereinafter CITRON, HATE].  
 56.  Kaitlin Rust, “Revenge Porn” Victim Speaks Out After Ex-husband Is Convicted, KPLC (Dec. 11, 
2017), http://www.kplctv.com/story/37042582/revenge-porn-victim-speaks-out-after-ex-husband-is-
convicted. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Rust, supra note 56. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
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online searches and social media audits before extending interview and job 
offers.63 Revenge porn victims report losing their jobs when their employers see 
the images posted and losing job opportunities when potential employers see 
these images. In complaints to the FTC, victims alleged that their employers 
received phone calls alerting them to where the victims’ photographs were posted 
online.64 Other victims despaired that the nonconsensual porn images were the 
first results that came up in Google searches of their names.65 
The reputational damage caused by online speech can have serious 
consequences beyond the professional realm. According to a 2014 study, one-third 
of victims of the more severe forms of online harassment believe that their 
reputation has been damaged as a result of that harassment.66 
C. Victims Cannot Fix, Forget or Fight Online Harassment 
Nonconsensual porn victims have limited resources outside of the legal 
system. In the United States, there is no statutory “right to forget” as there is in 
many European countries.67 Some victims seek help from advocacy organizations 
such as the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, which receives between twenty and thirty 
such requests every month.68 In general, victims have three options: fix it, forget it, 
or fight it. As described below, none of these is truly satisfactory, but there are 
ways to make at least one of them more effective. 
A nonconsensual porn victim’s first option is to try to fix the problem, 
primarily by removing the offending images and information from the internet. 
Reputation management companies offer to help, for a fee, by using search engine 
optimization that pushes positive content about a person to the top of a search 
result and therefore makes it less likely that negative results will come up quickly. 
One such company, Reputation Defender, offers packages that range in price 
between $3,000 and $25,000 for the basic service level.69 
Reputation management companies have reputation problems of their own, 
however.  Some victims of nonconsensual porn will hesitate to use them in light 
of a widely publicized scheme involving a firm called Change My Reputation.70 
This firm was run by Kevin Bollaert, who simultaneously operated a revenge porn 
site called UGotPosted.com.71 When victims complained about their images on 
 
 63.  CITRON, HATE, supra note 5, at 7-9. 
 64.  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 15, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
EMP Media, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00035 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2018) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cases/1623052_myex_complaint_1-9-18.pdf.  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 7, at 7. 
 67.  Jeff John Roberts, The Right To Be Forgotten From Google? Forget It, Says U.S. Crowd, FORTUNE: 
TECH (Mar. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/12/the-right-to-be-forgotten-from-google-forget-it-
says-u-s-crowd/. 
 68.  Franks, supra note 22, at 2. 
 69.  Personal Online Reputation Management, REPUTATION DEFENDER, https://www.reputation 
defender.com/reputation (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 70.  Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 345, 368–69 (2014). 
 71.  Id. at 368.  
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UGotPosted, Bollaert directed them to Change My Reputation, which then 
charged the victims between $250 and $350 to remove their images.72 Bollaert and 
his colleague were later ordered to pay one victim $385,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages.73 In another more recent example, the FTC investigated a 
website called MyEx.com, which solicited pictures, videos and personal 
information of victims and urged visitors to “Submit Pics and Stories of Your Ex.”74 
The site then allegedly charged several victims between $500 and $2,800 to remove 
their images and information.75 
A second option is for nonconsensual porn victims to try to forget what has 
been done to them and avoid the images altogether. Revenge porn, however, is 
usually inescapable. It is not practical for a victim to simply stay off social media 
because of its ubiquity in modern life. The mob mentality of nonconsensual porn 
promoters makes it likely that offending images will spread rather than 
evaporating. The popularity of websites dedicated to revenge porn, such as 
UGotPosted and MyEx, contributes to this phenomenon.  Even if it were feasible 
for victims to stay offline, the larger consequence may be the departure of 
primarily young females and other members of marginalized groups from the 
realm of online discussions, an outcome which is neither socially desirable nor 
particularly just.76 
A third option is for victims to fight back. Given our legal system’s preference 
for open fora, one traditional response to the notion that hate speech can cause 
harm has been to observe that more speech can counter it.77 As Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote in a 1927 case concerning the extent to which certain speech posed 
a threat to society, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”78 But this is not feasible in the context of revenge porn. Revenge porn 
victims cannot meet their harassers with equal and opposite force. A woman 
whose naked image has been disseminated across the internet faces social, 
economic, and professional repercussions that may last for years. A girl who faces 
online harassment usually cannot fight back with equal and opposing harassment, 
even if we would want her to as a matter of social policy, especially if she has no 
idea who harassed her in the first place. More speech does not help a woman 
whose home address has been disclosed, or one whose children’s names and 
schools have been broadcast alongside private images of her. The victims’ inability 
to counter their harassment with more speech is especially great when their 
harassers’ identity is unknown. 
 
 72.  ‘Revenge Porn’ Site Ordered to Pay Ohio Woman $385,000, NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014 9:42 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/revenge-porn-site-ordered-pay-ohio-woman-385-000-
n57276. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  FTC and Nevada Seek to Halt Revenge Porn Site, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/ftc-nevada-seek-halt-revenge-porn-site. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Alice Marwick, A New Study Suggests Online Harassment is Pressuring Women and Minorities to 
Self-Censor, QUARTZ (Nov. 24, 2016), https://qz.com/844319/a-new-study-suggests-online-harassment-
is-pressuring-women-and-minorities-to-self-censor/. 
 77.  See, e.g., Franklyn Haiman, The Remedy Is More Speech, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Summer 1991), 
http://prospect.org/article/remedy-more-speech. 
 78.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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The unique nature of nonconsensual porn’s viral spread, permanence, and 
harm requires a unique legislative and procedural approach. At a minimum, it is 
necessary for scholars and legislators to reconsider whether our traditional 
assumptions about anonymity should be challenged in this context. Civil plaintiffs 
and criminal complainants are required or strongly encouraged to disclose their 
identities, while people accused of civil violations or criminal acts enjoy more 
anonymity and protection from unmasking. It may be sensible to moderate both 
of those presumptions in the context of nonconsensual porn. 
II. NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMS NEED GREATER PRIVACY FOR FULL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 
Anonymity affects nonconsensual porn victims and perpetrators in opposite 
ways. Anonymity is, to some extent, a right protected by the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to speak anonymously as part of the 
right of free speech.79 Anonymity in judicial proceedings, however, is subject to a 
complex and variable set of rules, as described below.  In the context of remedying 
nonconsensual porn harms, this article is primarily concerned with two kinds of 
anonymity issues: suing pseudonymously, also known as suing as “Plaintiff Doe,” 
and uncovering the identity of an anonymous defendant.  There is no uniform 
federal standard for suing under a pseudonym, nor is there a uniform federal 
standard for unmasking an anonymous source of alleged nonconsensual porn.  
The complexity of rules surrounding each aspect of nonconsensual porn litigation 
exacerbates the difficulty of bringing alleged nonconsensual porn tortfeasors and 
criminals to justice. 
Effectively limiting nonconsensual porn requires consideration of two 
changes. The first is to make it safer for victims who fear retaliation to use both the 
civil and criminal channels of the legal system by allowing them to proceed 
without disclosing their true identity. The second is to make it easier to identify 
anonymous perpetrators of nonconsensual porn, a remedy that may require the 
participation of ICPs.  The first of these suggestions is explored here in Section II, 
and the second follows in Section III. 
A. Nonconsensual Porn Victims Face Significant Difficulties in Securing Legal 
Rights 
In the context of nonconsensual porn, anonymity works for the accused and 
against the accuser.  Current standards make it all but impossible for a victim of 
anonymous online harassment to take a legal stand against harassers that she 
cannot identify. Anonymity online offers a cloak of protection for nonconsensual 
porn perpetrators because there is relatively little risk that their identity will be 
disclosed and that they will therefore be subject to criminal or civil liability. 
 
 
 79.  See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. Of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–67 
(2002) (finding that a law requiring a permit to distribute pamphlets door-to-door was unconstitutional 
because it infringed on the speaker’s First Amendment rights); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“[T]he anonymity of an author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to 
exclude her work product from the protections of the First Amendment.”). 
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No such protection is available to victims of nonconsensual porn in most 
cases. A limiting factor in curbing nonconsensual porn is the reluctance of victims 
to come forward, often because they fear further retaliation. This fear is reasonable, 
given the mob mentality encouraged by many of the websites dedicated to revenge 
porn, and the increasingly common practice of competing to see who can hound 
victims most effectively.80 
One measure that might pave the way for more legal challenges to online 
harassment would be to relax the requirements for filing a lawsuit 
pseudonymously.  Being able to remain anonymous might make it easier for 
victims of severe online harassment to sue their attackers. Online harassment 
victims may hesitate to sue their attackers in part because they do not want to 
suffer from the increased attention, and potentially increased harassment, that 
comes with filing a lawsuit. Many victims of nonconsensual porn are too ashamed 
to come forward, or reluctant to admit that sexually explicit photos were taken of 
them under any circumstances, even though the practice of sending nude pictures 
is increasingly common, especially among young women.81 According to one 
survey, thirty-seven percent of teenage girls say that they have sent nude or semi-
nude photos by text, email or IM, while fifty-six percent of women age 20-26 say 
that they have done so.82 
A key limitation of these theories is the understandable hesitation of 
nonconsensual porn victims to expose themselves to the mob exacerbation and 
doxxing that usually accompany publicized examples of nonconsensual porn.  As 
discussed below, the standards for pleading under a pseudonym in civil cases vary 
widely and often impose dauntingly high burdens of proof for the applicant in 
comparison with named plaintiffs.  Although most states have enacted 
nonconsensual porn-specific laws within the last several years, few of them 
provide the kinds of anonymous pleading provisions that would make it easier for 
nonconsensual porn victims either to file civil lawsuits on their own or to become 
victim-witnesses in criminal prosecutions under those laws. 
B. Putative Doe Plaintiffs Face Variable Pleading Standards 
Nonconsensual porn victims have been able to use various traditional legal 
claims to address this nontraditional harm, at least in theory.  Scholars have 
suggested the expanded use of largely tort-based remedies, including claims for 
invasion of privacy, as well as copyright infringement.83  While the First 
Amendment protects against government regulation of some speech, not all 
speech is protected to the same extent.  Unlawful surveillance, cyber-stalking, 
child pornography (if the subject is under 18) and hacking (if the images were 
taken using the subject’s phone or computer without consent) all may be potential 
bases of liability in cases like these.84 The definitions of cyber-harassment and 
 
 80.  Vora, supra note 24, at 230–31. 
 81.  Sexting Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/sexting-statistics/ (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2018). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See Scott D. Camassar, Cyberbullying and the Law: An Overview of Civil Remedies, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 567 (2012).  
 84.  Related Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/related-laws/ 
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cyber-stalking vary from state to state, however, as do the accompanying 
standards for determining the accused’s intent.85 
Another legal basis for combating nonconsensual porn may be an increase in 
the penalties associated with civil rights violations or hate speech in certain cases. 
These enhanced penalties could attach to speech that (1) causes or is likely to cause 
certain kinds of harm, or (2) targets religious and/or sexual identity. In a 2014 book, 
Danielle Citron argued that because online harassment targets women and 
minorities disproportionately and limits their freedom of self-expression, 
employment prospects and personal safety, it should be treated as a civil rights 
violation.86 Her idea of scaling penalties up based on the targets of the speech, in 
addition to the contents of the speech, is sensible. Such a legislative revision would 
take into account the realities of online harassment’s effects on people who have 
historically suffered from hatred, bigotry and misogyny.  The amplification effects 
of nonconsensual porn, which give harassers vastly more firepower as well as 
mobs of co-harassers, suggest that it is fair to increase penalties where the speech 
is directed at historically disempowered people. 
These theoretical bases of liability may provide little relief in practice, 
however, if the victims cannot identify their attacker and if the victims feel unsafe 
themselves in asserting their claims.  It is not easy to file a civil lawsuit asserting 
claims under any of these theories without disclosing the plaintiff’s identity. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow it presumptively; Rule 10(a) requires 
disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.87 Many states have laws of procedure that 
mirror Rule 10(a).88 A tradition in favor of open judicial proceedings, and therefore 
implicitly opposed to anonymous pleading, dates back to 15th century England.89 
Filing a lawsuit under a false name requires judicial approval, and cannot be 
done as of right.90  Every federal court requires judicial consent after consideration 
of several factors.91 There is no uniform standard across circuits, however, and the 
standards for such consent vary considerably. 
There is a strong judicial presumption that parties will use their real names 
in litigation, as required by Rule 10(a). One reason offered for this presumption is 
the idea that disclosing litigants’ identities “furthers the public interest in knowing 
the facts surrounding judicial proceedings.”92 As another scholar put it, the right 
to proceed anonymously is disfavored because of the “shield and veil it creates 
 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2018). 
 85.  Online Harassment & Cyberstalking, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacy 
rights.org/consumer-guides/online-harassment-cyberstalking (last visted Mar. 27, 2018)..  
 86.  CITRON, HATE, supra note 55. 
 87.  FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (requiring that all parties to a civil action be named in the complaint). 
 88.  See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 10(a); ARK. R. CIV. P. 10(a); OHIO R. CIV. P. 10(a); S.C. R. CIV. P. 10(a). 
 89.  David C. Scileppi, Note, Anonymous Corporate Defamation Plaintiffs: Trampling the First 
Amendment or Protecting the Rights of Litigants?, 54 FLA. L. REV. 333, 337–38 (2002). 
 90.  Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F. Supp. 2d 90, 99 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 91.  The legal standards are discussed in Section 0 infra. 
 92.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Employers, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 99; see also Doe v. Vill. of 
Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the public has a right to know the names of 
litigants who take up time, space, and money in the court system that the public is paying for). 
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between the court and the public.”93 Some courts justify the requirements of Rule 
10(a) by reference to the public’s interest in open trials because it requires plaintiffs 
to “name all the parties.”94 While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there 
are circumstances in which the general interest in judicial openness is outweighed 
by other interests, it has noted that those instances are rare.95 
In response, however, some scholars have pointed out that the public interest 
in open trials is not undermined by allowing plaintiffs to proceed under a 
pseudonym. As Professor Kessler observed, “[i]t is the rare case today in which 
the public cannot realize the full benefits of an open trial without knowing the 
plaintiff’s name” because salient elements of the plaintiff’s identity are widely 
available through electronic databases.96 Professor Edwards has also suggested 
that pseudonymous proceedings actually may make trials fairer because it is less 
likely in those cases that the jurors will be able to search the internet for, and be 
influenced by, information that is not presented at trial.97 
In certain types of cases, however, more leeway is granted to plaintiffs who 
want to proceed anonymously.98 Courts usually grant requests to proceed 
anonymously to victims in cases involving sexual assault.99 Anonymity is also 
often granted in cases involving minors.100 
 
 93.  Chloe Booth, Good Things Don’t Come to Those Forced to Wait: Denial of a Litigant’s Request to 
Proceed Anonymously Can be Appealed Prior to Final Judgment in the Wake of Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 
58 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 205, 211–12 (2017).  
 94.  FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); see Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that Rule 
10(a) “has constitutional overtones” related to the public interest in open proceedings). But Professor 
Carol M. Rice disputes whether Rule 10(a) has any direct connection to the policy goals advanced by 
open judicial proceedings. She argues that Rule 10(a)’s pleading requirements are not designed to 
preserve open courts or to bar pseudonymous pleading, and contends that “Rule 10(a) simply seeks to 
distinguish the more formal caption in the complaint from all others, which for economy 
need not list every party,” and that “Rule 10(a) does not necessarily dictate the substance of the name 
designation.”  
Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 883, 915 (1996). 
 95.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (stating 
that the circumstances under which proceedings in a criminal trial should not be shared with the public 
are limited). 
 96.  Jayne Kessler, Privacy, Plaintiff, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information 
Age, 53 KANSAS L. REV. 195, 218 (2004).  
 97.  Edwards, supra note 7, at 445.  
 98.  See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (giving 
examples of types of cases, such as those that require privacy protections for rape victims and other 
vulnerable parties, that warrant a party to a litigation to proceed anonymously); Doe v. City of Chicago, 
360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) (adding that a party’s fear of retaliation as a response for instituting a 
litigation can be a compelling reason for the court to allow the party to proceed anonymously). 
 99.  See, e.g., Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (allowing anonymity in a case 
involving false claims of child sexual abuse to curb plaintiff’s future psychological harm); Doe v. Howe, 
607 S.E.2d 354, 357 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing plaintiff who was sexually abused by a school 
employee to use a pseudonym). 
 100.   See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing anonymity for plaintiffs 
who challenged constitutionality of prayer and bible readings in a public school because of real 
threatened violence and retaliation against their children); see also  Lisa M. Jones et al., Protecting 
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Following this presumption, courts generally permit pseudonymous 
litigation “only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive 
and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated 
against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.”101 
Using a false name is not allowed “where the plaintiff merely cites personal 
embarrassment” as the reason for seeking confidentiality.102 
Aside from these types of cases, courts usually engage in balancing tests to 
determine whether to approve a plaintiff’s request to file under a false name.103  
There is no uniform federal standard as to when this approval should be given.  
The D.C. Circuit Court follows the five factor test set out in National Association of 
Waterfront Employers v. Chao, which directs courts to consider:104 
“(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid 
the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy 
in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature; 
(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the 
requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; 
(3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; 
(4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and 
(5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it 
to proceed anonymously.”105 
The factors that provide the most room for debate in this context are the first 
and second.  The first, which asks whether the request is “merely” to avoid 
annoyance or to “preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal 
nature,” will swing in the plaintiff’s favor if the court agrees that the online 
harassment is, in fact, sensitive and highly personal.  It is easy to imagine a judge 
finding that the nonconsensual spread of nude photographs initially taken with 
the plaintiff’s consent is neither sensitive nor highly personal. Many people still 
blame the victims of nonconsensual pornography.  While rape shield laws protect 
rape victims from having evidence of prior consensual sex with the defendant 
used as evidence against them, there are no comparable protections for victims of 
nonconsensual pornography. 
The second factor considers the risk of “retaliatory physical or mental harm” 
to the plaintiff and to “innocent non-parties.” The risk of mental harm likely will 
be more significant than the risk of physical harm to most victims of online 
 
Victims’ Identities in Press Coverage of Child Victimization, 11 JOURNALISM 347, 349 (2010) (explaining that 
enhanced privacy provisions for minors in the judicial system stems from the idea that stigma is 
especially detrimental to a child’s development and impedes the child’s ability to move on from bad 
circumstances in their past). 
 101. Nat’l Ass’n. of Waterfront Employers v. Chao, 587 F. Supp. 2d 90, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(quotations omitted).. 
 102.  Id.at 100. 
 103.  See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186 (announcing that there is no “hard and fast formula” in deciding 
when a party may proceed anonymously but the decision calls for a balancing of the parties’ interests); 
Booth, supra note 93, at 213 (explaining that courts routinely balance a number of factors in weighing 
the parties’ interests); see also Edwards, supra note 7 at 441 (explaining that the procedural methods for 
proceeding pseudonymously vary by circuit).   
 104.  Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Employers, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 99.   
 105. Id.   
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harassment. Some victims have experienced physical harm from their online 
stalkers, however, and a United Nations study has suggested that cyber violence 
is equivalent to physical violence for women.106 To the extent that the risk of 
“mental harm” requires expert testimony from a mental health professional, 
however, that determination only increases the cost and decreases the accessibility 
of this option for putative plaintiffs. 
The third factor, concerning the age of the person whose privacy would be 
protected, does not limit relief to minors by its terms.  It does suggest, however, 
that the court is more likely to grant relief to younger applicants. 
Whether a nonconsensual porn victim would be able to satisfy each of these 
factors depends on at least two considerations.  The first is whether the victim will 
be able to establish that the request is justified in order to “preserve privacy in a 
matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature,” as the first factor states.  The 
private and personal nature of nonconsensual porn makes it likely that this factor 
will weigh in favor of the victim. 
The second consideration is whether the judge evaluating the request takes a 
conservative or progressive view of the alleged nonconsensual porn and its 
accompanying damages.  In other words, is the judge more likely to see the 
nonconsensual disclosure and reposting of sexual images as posing a “risk of 
retaliatory … mental harm to the requesting party” or as “mere” personal 
embarrassment?  The former would weigh in favor of allowing the pseudonymity, 
while the latter would weigh against it.  There is reason to believe that at least 
some judges will take a more conservative view.  In one recent analysis of judicial 
language in revenge porn cases, a scholar observed that courts rely on what she 
calls “trivializing words” to downplay or minimize the kinds of harm that the 
victims experienced.107 “In these opinions,” she notes, “judicial language generally 
indicates little to no recognition of the harms that the victim experienced or of the 
impacts of the amplification effects of revenge porn.”108 
The consequences of denying a putative plaintiff’s motion to proceed 
anonymously can be significant. Without this option, and in the face of the public 
humiliation, shame and fear of retaliation, such plaintiffs are likely to abandon 
their claims.109 One scholar has suggested that compelling plaintiffs who alleged 
sexual crimes to litigate under their real names is a form of re-victimization.110  As 
the ability to collect personal details about people through internet searches 
expands, including those people’s addresses and employers, the potential 
backlash against plaintiffs in nonconsensual porn cases may become more severe. 
 
 
 106.  Charlotte Alter, U.N. Says Cyber Violence Is Equivalent to Physical Violence Against Women, TIME 
(Sep. 25, 2015) http://time.com/4049106/un-cyber-violence-physical-violence/. 
 107.  Vora, supra note 24, at 243. 
 108.  Id. at 245. 
 109.  Booth, supra note 93, at 218. 
 110.  Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare: A Procedural Rule That Cannot Adequately Protect Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiffs from Embarrassing Exposure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 155–56 (1998) (explaining that 
childhood sexual abuse is one of the most personal and private issues and forcing a plaintiff to have 
this abusive past exposed has the potential to be irreparably damaging). 
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C. State Regulation of Nonconsensual Porn Provides Inconsistent Relief and 
Insufficient Victim Anonymity 
The difficulties posed by inconsistent anonymity pleading standards have 
not been resolved by the recent explosion of new nonconsensual porn regulation 
at the state and local levels.  These new laws prohibiting nonconsensual 
pornography is a vital component of the legal response to this problem. Without 
a clear means of unmasking potential defendants, however, these legislative 
efforts are ineffective in many cases and perhaps in the most severe cases.  In 
addition, these cases can be hard to litigate for procedural reasons.  The police may 
be unfamiliar with the state laws, if any, or may be unsure about how to establish 
the computer forensics necessary to prosecute the case.111 
Perhaps in response to the insufficiency of traditional tort remedies to combat 
nonconsensual porn, states and some cities have stepped in to create new 
nonconsensual porn legislation.  In November 2017, New York City passed its own 
nonconsensual porn law, as New York State does not yet have a similar law.112 
New York City’s law makes the nonconsensual dissemination of intimate images 
“with the intent to cause economic, physical or substantial emotional harm” a 
misdemeanor, punishable by a $1,000 fine and up to one year of jail.113 While 
celebrating this development, Mary Anne Franks, a leading scholar of 
nonconsensual porn regulation and co-founder of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 
noted that the likely effectiveness of the law was limited in three ways.114  First, the 
intent requirement narrows the scope of the crime to revenge porn, letting people 
who engage in nonconsensual porn for “profit or entertainment purposes 
completely off the hook.”115 Second, the law contains an exception for disclosures 
protected by the First Amendment, and it is not clear what that means in this 
context.  Finally, Franks noted that the classification of revenge porn as a 
misdemeanor limits the extent to which prosecutors will investigate and pursue 
these cases seriously.116 
The rapid expansion of state revenge porn laws, from 3 in 2012 to 38 in 2017, 
attests to the viral spread of nonconsensual porn and the need for a unique 
regulatory approach.  Until 2012, only three states – New Jersey, Alaska and Texas 
– had outlawed nonconsensual pornography.  Since 2012, however, 35 other states 
have outlawed this conduct.117 The distribution of sexually explicit images without 
the subject’s consent therefore is now illegal under the laws of 38 states as well as 
 
 111.  Margaret Talbot, Taking Trolls to Court, at 56 NEW YORKER, Dec. 15, 2016.  
 112.  Melanie Ehrenkranz, Revenge Porn is Finally Criminalized in New York City, GIZMODO (Nov. 16, 
2017) https://gizmodo.com/revenge-porn-is-finally-criminalized-in-new-york-city-1820482756. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  These include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
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the District of Columbia.118 These laws vary tremendously in their content and 
scope.119 In addition, legislative efforts to enact similar laws are underway or are 
pending in eight other states as well as Puerto Rico.120 
There is no federal law against nonconsensual pornography in the United 
States.  A Senate proposal to criminalize nonconsensual porn, whose short title is 
the Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment (ENOUGH) Act of 
2017, was introduced in November 2017.121 Facebook and Twitter supported the 
bill.122 The previous year, in August 2016, Representative Jackie Speier introduced 
a similar bill called the Intimate Privacy Protection Act that would have 
established a federal law prohibiting its distribution.123 The bill was not enacted.124 
The regulation of nonconsensual porn is challenging in part because of First 
Amendment concerns. Laws restricting the content of speech, possibly including 
nonconsensual pornography, are invalid for violation of the First Amendment 
unless they are “necessary to a compelling state interest.”125 Courts have, however, 
allowed the proscription of many kinds of harmful speech, including incitement, 
threats, obscenity, child pornography and criminal conspiracies.126 Laws targeting 
nonconsensual porn may risk a First Amendment challenge because of their 
presumed content-based restrictions.127 As Professor Mary Anne Franks explained 
in a guide to developing effective revenge porn laws, laws that criminalize 
behavior based on an intent to harass, humiliate or cause emotional distress may 
also violate the First Amendment by characterizing that behavior as harassment 
rather than an invasion of privacy.128 One scholar has suggested that 
nonconsensual porn may be regulated as a form of hate speech or group libel, 
which has low First Amendment value.129 Unlike group libel, which is less 
protected because it undermines social beliefs about a portion of the population130, 




 118.  Id. 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  Franks, supra note 22, at 4.   
 121.  Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment (ENOUGH) Act of 2017, S. 2162, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
 122.  Chris Morris, Revenge Porn Law Could Make It A Federal Crime to Post Explicit Photos Without 
Permission, 
 FORTUNE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/28/revenge-porn-law/. 
 123.  Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016).   
 124.  Id.   
 125.  Koppelman, supra note 51, at 662. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Cooke, supra note 52, at 482. 
 128.  Franks, supra note 22, at 7, 8. 
 129.  Cooke, supra note52, at 485. 
 130.  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 258 (5th ed. 2016) (“Group libel is of ‘low’ 
First Amendment value because it operates not by persuasion but by insidiously undermining social 
attitudes and beliefs.”). 
Brown Macro file (Do Not Delete) 5/8/2018  9:02 PM 
 PROTECTING DOES AND OUTING MOBSTERS 173 
One advocacy organization dedicated to ending nonconsensual porn131, the 
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, has developed model state132 and federal133 criminal 
laws as well as a model civil law134 to combat nonconsensual porn. The model civil 
law provides an option for proceeding anonymously, specifying that “all 
information about the plaintiff may be redacted from pleadings and court filings 
and the plaintiff may proceed under [a] pseudonym.”135  It also mandates that the 
“court shall inform the plaintiff of the option to proceed under [a] pseudonym at 
the earliest possible point and shall maintain the records in a manner that protects 
the plaintiff’s confidentiality.”136  These provisions underscore the importance, 
from the perspective of advocates for effective nonconsensual porn legislation, of 
allowing plaintiffs to proceed without fear that their personal information will be 
disclosed to the public as a consequence of litigation.  The model civil law does 
not, however, make any provision for uncovering the identity of a pseudonymous 
defendant. 
Indeed, only a few enacted state laws allow nonconsensual porn victims to 
proceed anonymously.  Under Connecticut’s recently revised laws, the names and 
addresses of victims of “voyeurism” (as the state describes the crime of recording 
another person without that person’s knowledge and consent) are confidential.137 
The victim’s identifying information may only be disclosed by order of the state’s 
Superior Court, although the information may be provided to the accused.138 
Victims of voyeurism also need not disclose their address or telephone number 
during any trial or evidentiary hearing, which further reduces the risk that their 
contact information will be disclosed on official court transcripts.139 
While these provisions are admirable, their benefits are limited by the 
relatively narrow scope of the statute. Connecticut’s definition of “voyeurism” 
omits much of what is popularly understood as nonconsensual porn. For example, 
“voyeurism” is defined as knowingly recording images of another person without 
that person’s knowledge and consent when the subject has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under any of the following conditions: (1) with malice, (2) 
for sexual gratification, (3) by trespass or (4) when the images are of the other 
 
 131.  While the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative’s website notes that its initial campaign was to end 
“revenge porn,” its “Guide for Legislators” explains that the term “‘revenge porn,’ though popular, is 
misleading” and notes that ‘[m]any victim advocates . . . use the term “nonconsensual pornography.” 
Compare The End Revenge Porn (ERP) Campaign, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cyber 
civilrights.org/erp-campaign/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) with Guide for Legislators, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/guide-to-legislation/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).  
 132.  CCRI Model State Law, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/
model-state-law/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018). 
 133.  CCRI Model Federal Law, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/
ccri-model-federal-law/ (last visted Mar. 27, 2018).  
 134.  CCRI Model Civil Law, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ccri-
model-civil-law/  (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  An Act Concerning Invasions of Privacy, 2015 Conn. Pub. Act No. 15-213, 4-5 (Reg. Sess.).  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. 
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person’s genitals or buttocks (which presumably covers “upskirting”).140 In effect, 
“voyeurism” as defined here applies only to nonconsensual recording, and not to 
nonconsensual distribution. It does not regulate the nonconsensual distribution of 
images taken with the subject’s consent even when there is an expectation that 
those images will remain private. A woman who sends nude pictures voluntarily 
by text to her boyfriend would have no cause of action under Connecticut’s laws 
if that boyfriend then posted those private images to a website or on social media. 
California’s nonconsensual porn laws establish a kind of de facto mens rea of 
intent to cause “serious emotional distress.” They provide, inter alia, that when a 
person distributes intimate images of another “under circumstances in which the 
persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private,” the distributor 
“knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional 
distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress.”141 
D. Minnesota’s Law Illustrates the Need for Greater Victim Protections. 
In 2016, Minnesota passed the most comprehensive state revenge porn law 
yet, but even this law does too little to support victims and encourage them to 
come forward.  This law, which went into effect on August 1, 2016, created both 
civil and criminal penalties by making it unlawful to “disseminate private sexual 
images of another without consent.”142 The law also prohibits sexual solicitation 
without the subject’s consent,143 such as in cases where a defendant posts a 
plaintiff’s personal information on a website such as Craigslist and, without her 
consent, invites other people to contact her for sex.  It creates a civil cause of action, 
allowing the court to award a prevailing plaintiff general and special damages, as 
well as any profit made from the dissemination of the images.144  In addition, the 
court may award a civil penalty to the plaintiff, up to $10,000, as well as court costs 
and reasonable attorneys’ fees.145  There is also a provision for injunctive relief, 
with a civil fine of up to $1,000 per day for failure to comply with the injunction.146 
This would penalize the continued display and/or distribution of the 
nonconsensual images. 
The exclusions in the Minnesota law are as important as its inclusions.  It 
explicitly excludes from coverage images made for the purpose of the legal sale of 
goods, including the “creation of artistic products for sale or display.”147 It also 
contains an exception for images that “relate to a matter of public interest” where 
“dissemination serves a lawful purpose.”148 The latter exception provides cover for 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  California S.B. 1255, Sec. 1.7 (amending Penal Code Section 647(j)(4)(A). 
 142.  Memorandum from Chris Turner, Minnesota Senate Fiscal Analyst, “S.F. No. 2713 - 
Dissemination of Private Sexual Images; Civil Action and Criminal Penalties (First Engrossment)” 
(May 2, 2016), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/billsumm/summary_display_from_
db.php?ls=89&id=4659.  
 143.  Revenge Pornography Act, MINN. STAT. § 604.31(2) (2016). 
 144.  Id. at § 604.31(3) 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at § 604.31(4) 
 147.  Id. at. § 604.31(6)(a)(4). 
 148.  Id. at § 604.31(6)(a)(5). 
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journalists who post sex tapes of celebrities, for example, if they can establish that 
it is in the public interest to do so. Another interesting feature of the Minnesota’s 
revenge porn law is its recognition of the need for sensitivity toward the privacy 
of the plaintiff.  To this end, the law specifically allows for the confidentiality of 
filings under the statute “to protect the privacy of the plaintiff.”149 
Recent litigation under this statute, however, demonstrates the shortcomings 
of this law.  In a recent case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s denial of the plaintiff’s request to proceed as “Jane Doe” in a lawsuit 
involving the nonconsensual filming of her while she was partially nude.150 The 
appellant, a professional entertainer, was hired to perform at a show involving a 
Hawaiian dance for a client company.151 Alleging that the defendants allowed their 
security cameras to capture her image while she was changing costumes, she sued 
them for negligence, invasion of privacy, and intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.152  In her complaint, she used a Jane Doe pseudonym, 
explaining that “she wished to proceed under a pseudonym because of the risk of 
harm to her career, reputation, and relationships if it were public knowledge that 
she had been filmed while partially nude.”153 The District Court denied her 
request, explaining that the Rules of Civil Procedure required her to use her true 
name and declining to exercise its discretion to allow her to proceed under a 
pseudonym.154  It reasoned that “the public’s interest in an open and transparent 
judiciary outweighed appellant’s claimed privacy interest.”155 
On appeal, Doe argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to take into account factors recognized by other courts favoring pseudonymity.156 
She also challenged the court’s characterization of her privacy interest as 
“changing clothes.”157  The appellate court noted that while the state’s civil 
procedure rules mandate that a party must include her true name on the summons 
and complaint, some statutes permit pseudonymous pleading.158 It expressly 
recognized that the newly enacted Minnesota nonconsensual porn law “expressly 
requires district courts to allow confidential filings in cases brought under the 
statute in order to protect the plaintiff’s privacy.”159 However, because the 
appellant did not frame her original claims as a violation of that statute, the court 
summarily concluded that its exceptions did not apply to her claims.160 
 
 149. Id. at § 604.31(5) (2016). 
 150.  Doe v. Empire Ent., LLC, No. A16-1283, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *1–2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. May 8, 2017). 
 151.  Id. at *2. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154. Empire Ent., LLC, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *3. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at *3–4. 
 158.  Id. at *5–6. 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id. While the decision does not explain why Doe did not assert claims under Minnesota’s NCP 
statute, one possibility is that the statute did not go into effect in time.  The events Doe alleged in her 
complaint took place in January 2016, and Minnesota’s law did not go into effect until August 1, 2016.  
Alternatively, it may have been an oversight on the part of her attorney, Peter Nickitas, who has been 
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In response to appellant’s arguments that the court should have evaluated 
her request according to factors used by other federal courts, the appellate court 
noted that Minnesota has not adopted a test for district courts to use when 
considering a request for pseudonymous pleading.161 It observed that most federal 
courts of appeal have established a balancing test in such cases, although the 
circuits differ on the factors to be weighed.162 While the language of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to that of the Minnesota rules on naming 
parties, Minnesota appellate courts are “not bound by federal interpretations of 
the federal rule.”163 
If there were an exception to the Minnesota rules, the court noted, it would 
be the province of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the “statutory rule-making 
process” to create one.164  It then concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by determining that the public interest in open proceedings outweighed 
the plaintiff’s interest in privacy.165 In dictum, the court suggested that this debate 
could have been avoided if the defendants had been more civil, noting that a 
defendant’s decision to challenge a plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously 
when “facing claims of a highly sensitive nature . . . could be viewed in some 
quarters and in some cases as unseemly.”166 
What is missing from the appellate court’s analysis is a response to the 
appellant’s claims that the district court unfairly minimized her privacy interest. 
While the court emphasized the traditional legal preference for open proceedings, 
nowhere in the decision did it analyze the weight of the countervailing interest in 
privacy in claims “of a highly sensitive nature.” It did not extrapolate an interest 
in procedural privacy from the statutory permission to file pseudonymously 
granted by the state’s new nonconsensual porn law, which appears to cover harms 
similar to those asserted by the appellant. Nor did it evaluate, even briefly, the 
appellant’s claims that she would suffer personal and professional harm from the 
use of her true name in the proceedings. It is easy to determine that the public’s 
interest in open proceedings outweighs a complainant’s interest in privacy when 
there is no acknowledgment of the severity of the harms that may flow from 
violation of that privacy in the instant case. Doe v. Empire illustrates the limitations 
of even a model state nonconsensual porn law when it comes to the privacy 
interests of nonconsensual porn victims. 
E. The Standards for Doe Plaintiffs Should Be Revised Fairly 
Given the extreme and permanent damage that nonconsensual porn can 
cause in this age of amplification, and the insufficient protections provided by 
 
suspended from practice in Minnesota four times as of this writing.  See Seth Leventhal, Peter “Extreme 
Caution” Nickitas Strikes Again, Gets a Spare This Time, MINNESOTA LITIGATOR (Aug. 18, 2017) 
http://www.leventhalpllc.com/2017/08/peter-extreme-caution-nickitas-strikes-again-gets-a-spare-this-
time/. 
 161.  Empire Ent., LLC, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *7. 
 162.  Id. at *8–9 (citing Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d. Cir. 2011)). 
 163.  Empire Ent., LLC, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 419, at *8. 
 164.  Id. at *10. 
 165.  Id. at *10–11. 
 166.  Id. at n 3. 
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nonconsensual porn laws in most states, it should be easier for plaintiffs to sue 
anonymously in online harassment cases where they can demonstrate that suing 
under their real name will increase the likelihood of mental harm. Even if it were 
easier for plaintiffs to file anonymous lawsuits against their online harassers, there 
would still be considerable barriers to justice for many plaintiffs. The cost of 
private litigation remains prohibitive, and the procedural work involved in 
securing the right to sue anonymously would only add to that cost. 
III. REVENGE PORN DEFENDANTS RECEIVE TOO MUCH IDENTITY PROTECTION 
Should courts adopt a prima facie standard to enable these victims to unmask 
anonymous commenters more easily?  If there is a right to speak anonymously on 
the internet, that right may be outweighed by the rights of tort victims to bring 
alleged anonymous harassers to justice.  Although making it easier for victims of 
online harassment to discover the identities of their harassers may be an attractive 
remedy, the practical and ethical difficulties of unmasking anonymous harassers 
are substantial. 
In some cases, the anonymous perpetrators and promoters of nonconsensual 
porn can be identified by the ICPs that host them.  In many cases, however, even 
the internet service providers (ISPs) and ICPs do not know the posters’ real 
identities and therefore cannot disclose them, as described below.  Even when ISPs 
and ICPs know these real identities, there is little legal incentive for them to 
disclose those identities because they are shielded from liability for the postings 
by the CDA.167 
Because not all anonymous posters can be unmasked, there is a strong need 
for greater deterrence of nonconsensual porn at the ICP level. ICPs should be 
compelled to monitor, deter and otherwise minimize the harm caused by 
nonconsensual porn because they are in the best technological position to do so. 
The fact that they are able to do so is evident from the voluntary efforts some ICPs 
are beginning to make under public pressure.  While these voluntary efforts are 
laudable, there would be greater security for nonconsensual porn victims if such 
efforts were legally required and widely applicable to all ICPs, including those 
who have not yet chosen to engage in them. 
A. Anonymity Exacerbates Online Harassment 
It has never been easier to be anonymous online. As it has become easier to 
track and monitor people’s internet usage, and as public awareness of monitoring 
has increased, new resources have sprung up to make it easier to use the internet 
anonymously. One example is Tor, an anonymizing browser.168 Tor describes itself 
as “an open network that helps you defend against traffic analysis, a form of 
network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential 
business activities and relationships, and state security.”169  It is unlikely that 
internet users will give up their anonymity online in the future. 
 
 
 167.  Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §230 (c)(1) (1996). 
 168.  TOR, https://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 169.  Id. 
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In recent years, scholars have debated the extent to which anonymity should 
be regulated on the Internet, especially in the context of tort and obscenity 
allegations.170 This is an especially contentious issue with regard to nonconsensual 
porn because anonymity is a significant factor in nonconsensual porn and online 
harassment in general. In many cases, online threats come from anonymous 
sources. More than half of those who have experienced online harassment say that 
they did not know the person involved in the most recent harassing incident.171 
The internet itself facilitates anonymity, by enabling people to post under assumed 
names. 172 More than 60% of internet users believe that online environments allow 
for more anonymity than their offline lives do.173 This belief is well grounded. 
Facebook found that harassment, bullying, and other online abuse is committed 
by people using fake names eight times more often than by people using their real 
names.174 
Yet anonymity online has important benefits. There is an honorable tradition 
of speaking anonymously or pseudonymously, especially about controversial 
issues. Most of the Federalist Papers were first published under pseudonyms, 
including those penned by Alexander Hamilton.175 Anonymity promotes free 
expression by minimizing the risks attached to being identified with specific 
beliefs or practices. It protects individuals’ privacy from public and private 
tracking. In a conservative political environment, for example, liberal thinkers may 
be more interested in hiding their search activity from potential monitoring 
because they anticipate the possibility of negative repercussions in the future.  
Being anonymous online can also have more vital consequences.  For certain 
groups, such as many victims of domestic violence whose abusers may seek them 
and their children out, anonymity is essential to everyday safety and wellbeing.  
For example, domestic violence victims benefit from the ability to be able to 
rebuild their lives without the risk of being located by their abusers. It would be 
not only unwise, but also dangerous to get rid of online anonymity altogether. 
B. Anonymous Nonconsensual Porn Perpetrators Cannot Be Unmasked Easily 
The spate of new state laws creating civil and criminal penalties for 
nonconsensual porn does little to help victims of anonymous nonconsensual porn 
 
 170.  See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV 501 (2013) (suggesting that 
internet regulators limit anonymity to avert more onerous limitations on generativity); Victoria Smith 
Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L & POL’Y 
405 (2003); Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in 
the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 92 (2012–13) 
(recommending adoption of a prima facie standard to unmask online speakers); Sophia Qasir, Note, 
Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651 (2013) (suggesting 
that courts expand the remedies available to victims of harmful online speech and proposing a 
summary judgment standard for unmasking online speakers). 
 171.  Duggan, supra note 37. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Lisa Vaas, Facebook Finally Changes Real-Name Policy, NAKED SECURITY (Nov. 3, 2015) 
 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/11/03/facebook-finally-changes-real-name-policy/. 
 175.  Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous Speech, 
120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2153 (2010-2011). 
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posts if neither the victim nor law enforcement officials can identify the 
perpetrators.  Plaintiffs must be able to identify defendants to sue them. When a 
victim of nonconsensual porn discovers that her images have been shared on the 
internet, she may not know the true identity of the person or people who shared 
the images. In such cases, a primary obstacle for potential plaintiffs in addressing 
these torts is finding out who the speaker is. Many harassers do not post under 
their own name, preferring to hide behind a pseudonymous user name. This is a 
common practice. It is easier for people to post potentially offensive comments and 
images under false names than under their own because there is less accountability 
for doing so.176 
While anonymity makes it easier to post nonconsensual porn images, it is 
harder for victims of nonconsensual porn to bring anonymous posters to justice in 
a civil action. Because courts have recognized a qualified right to speak 
anonymously,177 there is no simple way to unmask an anonymous commentator. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that there is a Constitutional right to speak 
anonymously without clarifying the standards under which an anonymous 
speaker may exercise that right.178 It has clarified, however, that whenever a party 
seeks the identity of an anonymous online poster, “the nature of the speech should 
be a driving force in choosing a standard.”179 It also mandates that the Court 
“consider[] the important value of anonymous speech balanced against a party’s 
need for relevant discovery in a civil action.”180 Virginia is the only state that has 
passed legislation defining the standards that must be met before an anonymous 
speaker’s identity can be disclosed to a requesting party.181 California considered 
similar legislation but did not pass it.182 
Over the last two decades, federal courts and some state courts have adopted 
rules for unmasking unknown defendants who are accused of committing certain 
torts online, including defamation, intellectual property infringement, tortious 
interference with contractual relations, and fraud.183 In such instances, the plaintiff 
is required to make some showing of likelihood of success beyond the standard 
pleading requirements.184 However, the difficulties plaintiffs face in making such 
 
 176.  Duggan, supra note 37. 
 177.  Mallory Allen, Ninth Circuit Unmasks Anonymous Internet Users and Lowers the Bar for Disclosure 
of Online Speakers, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 75, 76-77 (2011).  
 178.  Compare with In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing 
to hold that district court abused its discretion in applying a summary judgment standard) with S103 
Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com LLC, 441 F. Appx. 431, 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating the district court’s 
decision to use a summary judgment standard); see also OBI Pharma, Inc. v. Does 1-20, Order Granting 
Ex Parte Motion for Early Discovery (S.D. Cal. 2017) (acknowledging that “The Ninth Circuit has not 
identified one specific test that applies anytime [sic] a party seeks the identity of an anonymous online 
poster through discovery.”). 
 179.  OBI Pharma, Inc., Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Early Discovery (S.D. Cal. 2017). 
 180.  Id. (citing In Re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176).  
 181.  See VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-407.1 (2012). 
 182.  A.B. 1143, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/asm/ab_1101-1150/ab_1143_bill_20030430_amended_asm.html. 
 183.  See Marian K. Riedy; Kim Sperduto, Revisiting the Anonymous Speaker Privilege, 14 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 249, 250 (2012). 
 184.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Amy P. Nickerson, Comment, Coercive Discovery and 
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a showing have been subject to critical consideration, and scholars have begun to 
question the wisdom of protecting anonymous posters online.185 Some have 
pointed out that anonymity online is especially dangerous, rather than being 
worthy of special protection.186 Professors Reidy and Sperduto argue that “the 
anonymous speaker privilege needs a substantial redirection not only because of 
the shaky jurisprudential basis for the privilege as it has been constructed, but also 
because the policy considerations that originally justified the creation of the 
privilege have been undermined by the realities of today’s Internet.”187 Despite 
substantial criticism of the anonymous speaker privilege among legal scholars, it 
largely remains in place. 
If unmasking anonymous posters is challenging in a civil case, the criminal 
law alternative may be even worse.  The criminal justice system is especially 
daunting for victims who cannot identify a defendant. Someone whose 
nonconsensual porn images are posted anonymously will have more difficulty 
getting criminal charges filed on her behalf than she would if the speaker were 
known.  Law enforcement officials may be unmotivated to try to identify 
anonymous speakers, in part because doing so is expensive and time-consuming. 
Identification may require the use of computer forensic specialists, which may 
require cooperation with outside agencies.188 Although one scholar has proposed 
a model federal cyber-harassment statute that would provide incentives for the 
investigation of anonymous online harassers, no such incentive currently exists.189 
C. ICPs Should Unmask Anonymous Posters, Subject to Limitations 
When it is possible to discover the identity of an anonymous nonconsensual 
porn poster by asking the hosting ICP, a victim or prosecutor may make that 
request.  The most direct way to discover the identity of an anonymous poster is 
to compel the ICP hosting the speaker to disclose his identity.  This is likely to yield 
mixed results, in that ICPs are notoriously resistant to such pressure. The 
mechanism for doing so may include issuing a subpoena to the ICP, with a 
substantial penalty attached for noncompliance. ICPs are unlikely to provide this 
information voluntarily.  Google, for example, specifies only one court from which 
is accepts requests from user data, and notes that “requests to identify users by 
real names or IP addresses may be declined.”190 
 
the First Amendment: Towards a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 846 (2010). 
 185.  Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing 
Over Legal Standards, 83 Or. L. Rev. 795, 822 (2004) (“The general right to speak anonymously on the 
Internet is substantially different from the asserted right to remain anonymous when anonymity is 
being used as a shield protecting tortious or illegal conduct. The rapidity with which false information, 
trade secrets, and the like can be spread over the Internet creates a serious hazard, a hazard which must 
be weighed in determining the proper judicial approach to these situations.”). 
 186.  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 63 (2009). 
 187.  Reidy and Sperduto, supra note 183, at 253. 
 188.  A. Meena Seralathan, Making the Time Fit the Crime: Clearly Defining Online Harassment Crimes 
and Providing Incentives for Investigating Online Threats in the Digital Age, 42 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 425, 
429 (2016).  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Serving Civil Subpoenas or Other Civil Requests on Google, GOOGLE, https://support. google.com/ 
faqs/answer/6151275?hl=en1497538752037 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).  
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Another problem with such subpoenas is that many ICPs cannot comply 
because they lack the knowledge to do so.  ICPs may not even know the real 
identity of any particular user. While Facebook requires users to use their real 
names,191 other ICPs and ISPs do not. Google discontinued its real name policy in 
2014, after three years of intense debate over the wisdom of controlling users’ 
ability to define their own online identity.192 Ongoing conflicts over policies that 
require users to disclose their real names are sometimes referred to as the 
“nymwars,” derived in part from the suffix “-nym” (as in pseudonym.)193 
In many other cases, however, it is possible for the ICP to identify the name 
of the poster. Social media companies may choose to comply with subpoenas. 
Doing so in the case of an accused nonconsensual porn poster certainly would be 
consistent with these companies’ use policies prohibiting nonconsensual porn.194 
At a minimum, it is often possible for social media companies to determine the 
physical location of an anonymous user with some precision using geolocation 
data.195 This data can be used to narrow down the area in which potential posters 
live and/or work, making it easier to identify possible perpetrators and 
defendants. 
Given the protections afforded to anonymous posters on the internet, First 
Amendment protections for many kinds of speech, the widespread social 
expectation and tradition that people may speak anonymously online, and the 
technological difficulties inherent in identifying the real identities of unknown 
speakers, it is unlikely that nonconsensual porn victims will be able to unmask 
anonymous posters through private action that does not involve cooperation by 
an ISP or ICP.  For that reason, it is necessary to reexamine the role that ICPs in 
particular play in the growth and spread of nonconsensual porn and the extent to 
which ICPs should be incentivized to stem this growth. 
IV. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT SHOULD INCENTIVIZE ICP DETERRENCE 
While improving the ability to identify perpetrators is a critical step, ICPs can 
also do more to deter and stem the growth of nonconsensual porn in other ways. 
Many social media companies have begun to do this voluntarily, which should be 
lauded. As is true with any voluntary effort, however, these practices can be 
withdrawn at any time. A comprehensive review of what ICPs can do to fight the 
nonconsensual porn epidemic, whose growth they have unintentionally 
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facilitated, should include a review of their role in stopping nonconsensual porn 
posts before or shortly after they occur.  As a first matter, however, it is necessary 
to reexamine the protections of the CDA. 
A. The CDA Shields ICPs from Liability for Nonconsensual Porn 
Nonconsensual porn victims generally cannot sue ICPs for damage done by 
anonymous posters because of the CDA’s safe harbor provision.196 As a general 
matter, the CDA shields social media companies and other ICPs from direct 
liability based on the information others publish on their networks. Section 230 of 
the CDA states that “no provider… of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”197 The CDA notes that “[i]ncreasingly Americans 
are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural and 
entertainment services.”198  It also underscores the United States’ policy to 
“promote the continued development of the Internet … and other interactive 
media.”199 
In one of the first cases to interpret the CDA, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals observed that Section 230 “plainly immunizes computer service 
providers like AOL from liability for information that originates with third 
parties.”200  The plaintiff in that case had been targeted by an anonymous online 
poster who had advertised items glorifying the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma six days after the bombing took place and listed the 
plaintiff’s telephone number as contact information.201  The plaintiff sued AOL for 
negligence in failing to prevent the re-posting of these allegedly defamatory 
advertisements after their removal. The court held that the CDA shielded AOL 
from liability under common law negligence claims. 
In explaining its rationale, the court observed that Congress enacted the CDA 
in order to protect online service providers from tort liability based on what its 
customers post.202  Given the massive numbers of online users, it reasoned that 
Congress had decided that service providers would have to restrict 
communication too much if they were liable for its content: 
The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an 
obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each 
of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability 
for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service 
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages 
posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and 
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chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.203 
But the CDA does not immunize online service providers from all liability.  It 
does not restrict the federal government’s ability to deter criminal activity and 
enforce criminal law.204 Indeed, the Act itself notes that “it is the policy of the 
United States … to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter 
and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer.”205 In other words, the CDA’s provisions will not bar a provider of 
online services from liability in connection with certain crimes facilitated by 
internet use. 
One concern an ICP may have about removing harassing posts is the threat 
of liability from the posters themselves.  The CDA protects them against precisely 
this type of claim, even when the poster claims that they have a right to be heard 
under the First Amendment.  The CDA explicitly protects any “provider or user 
of an interactive computer service” from liability based on any voluntary 
restriction or removal of material that the provider or user finds to be “obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”206 
B. ICPs’ Efforts to Combat Nonconsensual Porn Are Helpful and Insufficient 
Some social media companies take it upon themselves to address the 
potential harm caused by anonymous sources by providing ways to report hate 
speech or harassment. Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit 
developed policies prohibiting nonconsensual porn in 2015.207 Twitter’s revised 
rules, for example, “prohibit the posting or sharing of intimate photos or videos 
that were or appear to have been taken or distributed without the subject’s 
consent.”208 As a consequence of posting such material, Twitter “will suspend any 
account [it identifies] as the original poster of intimate media that has been 
produced or distributed without the subject’s consent,” and will also suspend 
accounts dedicated to nonconsensual porn.209 Instagram and Tumblr also 
developed removal policies for nonconsensual porn.210 
Such self-regulation is helpful, yet limited in its scope and effectiveness.  For 
example, many reporting mechanisms process complaints according to an 
algorithm rather than subjecting reports to human review, and do not allow 
people reporting abuse to challenge automated responses that are inaccurate or 
inadequate.  Self-regulation is also voluntary, and can be withdrawn or scaled back 
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when these companies decide that it is no longer in their interest to provide a 
reporting service.  There is little external incentive for social media companies to 
provide consistent, reliable unmasking responses.  Indeed, many may fear that the 
accused users would sue for violation of what they consider to be their rights of 
anonymity. 
Perhaps the most promising means of unmasking anonymous harassers is 
the voluntary and collaborative efforts of the ICPs who host them.  Although there 
has been great resistance to social media companies’ real name policies as a general 
matter, including the nymwars, there is reason to believe that there may be less 
resistance to unmasking in the context of online harassment. Much of the 
resistance to real-name policies stemmed from the fact that drag queens and other 
marginalized members of society relied on fake names for a variety of beneficial, 
or at least innocuous reasons, and saw the real-name policies as a means of 
marginalizing them further.211  There is no comparable social benefit in shielding 
alleged nonconsensual porn posters from criminal prosecution or civil liability. 
Social media companies have cooperated in unmasking a different kind of 
assailant: terrorists. Spurred in part by criticism that they have not done enough 
to monitor and deter terrorism, Facebook, Twitter and Google have been devoting 
increased resources to finding and removing terrorist propaganda videos and to 
shutting down accounts linked to violent terrorist groups.212 Advertiser boycotts 
and lawsuits are compelling them to do so.213 While these companies have relied 
largely on user reports to flag potential offenders, new techniques are being 
developed, including algorithms that identify signature images of terrorist 
content.214 This technique is similar to PhotoDNA, which matches images posted 
online with those in the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children’s image 
database.215 There is some debate, however, over the effectiveness of these new 
techniques and the probability of their long-term success, especially with regard 
to their ability to screen video content.216 Nonetheless, in a joint statement in 
December 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube pledged to create a 
shared database of unique digital signifiers for violent terrorist imagery, in an 
effort to “curb the pressing global issue of terrorist content online.”217 
Facebook is also taking some degree of responsibility for monitoring other 
kinds of domestic violence.  Police and prosecutors in the Chicago area attribute a 
rise in the number of gang-related murders there in part to social media and 
streaming platforms such as Facebook Live, which launched in 2016.218  They 
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believe that social media exacerbates a culture of violence and helps escalate 
disputes.  A state’s attorney for Cook County said that these platforms “pour[] an 
accelerant on what was already there.”  Facebook responded to journalists’ 
inquiries about this connection by noting that it would double the number of 
employees reviewing content on Facebook for dangerous and hateful speech to 
20,000 in 2018, up from 10,000 in 2017. 
The same can and should be done with regard to the most tortious forms of 
online harassment. If social media companies can develop new tools and devote 
more resources to detecting and deterring terrorism, they can take similar steps 
toward combating online harassment.  They can, for example, join forces to 
develop a shared database of revenge porn imagery and language commonly used 
by the online mobs who cause the amplification effects that terrorize so many 
victims. They can collaborate to develop more efficient ways of deterring 
nonconsensual porn, and they can make a public statement of their intent to do so.  
Taking a public and concerted stand against this kind of online harassment would 
be more than just symbolic.  It would establish a stronger industry intolerance for 
tortious hate speech, cyberstalking and harassment that would affect putative 
harassers and, in all likelihood, reduce the number of victims and the extent of 
their harassment. 
Facebook, in fact, is already running programs to streamline the removal of 
nonconsensual porn in other countries. In November 2017, Facebook announced 
an experimental strategy in Australia to “help prevent non-consensual intimate 
images from being posted and shared anywhere on Facebook, Messenger and 
Instagram.”219 In this pilot program, users are asked to send Facebook the images 
they are concerned about via Messenger.  Facebook then “hashes” those images, 
giving them a unique digital fingerprint that can be used to stop further 
distribution of those images. In this program, Facebook is partnering with an 
Australian government agency that focuses on electronic safety. A study released 
in May 2017 reported that 23 percent, or one in five, Australians between the age 
of 16 and 49 reported being subject to “image-based abuse.”220 This was defined to 
include images showing breasts or genitals, including pictures taken during 
showering or bathing and “upskirting and downblousing.”221 
Supporters lauded the program because it allows both victims of 
nonconsensual porn and people who are worried about becoming nonconsensual 
porn victims to take preventative action.222 Critics expressed concern, among other 
things, that Facebook’s solution required victims and potential victims of 
nonconsensual porn to post their images proactively, trusting that Facebook staff 
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would handle them appropriately, when Facebook has shown itself repeatedly to 
be something less than trustworthy.223 One observer suggested that a better 
approach would not involve disclosure of the image at all, but rather a telephone 
call to Facebook alerting them to the problem.224 Any approach that does not 
specify a particular problematic image, however, is unlikely to succeed.  Whether 
the monitoring, prohibition and/or removal of nonconsensual porn is done by a 
government agency, a social media company such as Facebook, or a combination 
thereof, it will be critical to know which images are nonconsensual and which are 
consensual so that the removal of images does not intrude into the realm of 
voluntary self-expression. 
Another solution ICPs should consider is the development of an internal 
flagging system that warns likely harassers that they may be about to break the 
law before they post.  One scholar has proposed that web hosts might warn users 
who are about to post shaming language of the consequences of doing so by using 
algorithms and filters designed to detect that activity.225  Warning potential 
nonconsensual porn posters of the potential consequences of their actions would 
make it easier to argue that those who post nonconsensual porn regardless of the 
warnings have the mens rea of recklessness, which the Model Penal Code defines 
as “consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
element exists or will result from this conduct.”226 
C. ICPs Should Be Compelled to Deter Nonconsensual Porn 
Facebook’s voluntary efforts to deter nonconsensual porn work as long as 
Facebook chooses to engage in them.  For these methods to be enduringly effective, 
however, they must be compulsory.  In order to make such measures compulsory, 
it may be necessary to amend the CDA to remove the shield it currently provides 
for ICPs.  One of the assumptions underlying the passage of the CDA was that it 
would be too cumbersome for online service providers to monitor their users’ 
posts for potentially harmful content.227 Given the subsequent developments in 
search technology, that is no longer necessarily true. 
More than twenty years after the enactment of the CDA, it is time to 
reexamine the wisdom of that law’s broad shield.  As other scholars have 
observed, the CDA no longer makes sense as a matter of technology policy.  Some 
have suggested that Congress amend the CDA to include notice and takedown 
provisions for online harassment, similar to those of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.228  Such provisions could require social media companies and ISPs 
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to remove online harassment when it is flagged as such. Under both proposals, 
social media companies and ISPs would take a far more active role in detecting 
and deterring online harassment.   While the CDA presumes that ICPs and social 
media companies should take a passive role with regard to online content, these 
more recent proposals, together with the sharp rise in frequency and corrosiveness 
of online harassment, envision a more active and socially responsible role for web 
hosts. 
The United States may not be the first country to hold ICPs legally responsible 
for doing too little to stop the spread of nonconsensual porn.  Recent proceedings 
in Northern Ireland suggest that Facebook may come under greater legal pressure 
to deter nonconsensual porn elsewhere in the world. In January 2018, the High 
Court in Belfast confirmed the settlement of a case in which a 14 year old victim of 
nonconsensual porn sued Facebook for failing to block the re-publication of her 
photo after she notified the company that it was taken without her consent.229 
Because there was no judgment against Facebook, the case has no precedential 
value, but it suggests that there is a greater risk of potential liability for an ICP’s 
failure to stop nonconsensual porn images from spreading than many industry 
analysts may have expected.230 In the wake of the settlement, lawyers reported 
being “deluged” with queries from nonconsensual porn victims interested in 
suing Facebook.231 
In the United States, some courts are already starting to question whether the 
CDA should provide a complete shield for ICPs in similar cases. In at least one 
case, a court has held a social media company liable for failure to warn some users 
about likely harm from other users. It concerned a model who alleged that a 
website was negligent under California law for failing to warn her about two 
website users’ practice of using the site to drug and rape models like her.232  In that 
case, plaintiff Jane Doe subscribed to the website Model Mayhem, a networking 
site for models, operated by defendant Internet Brands.233 Two men used the site 
to identify women, whom they contacted posing as agents, and lure them to a fake 
modeling audition in Florida.234 The men then drugged their victims, raped them, 
and videotaped their acts for distribution as pornography.235 Doe became one of 
these victims.236 She alleged that Internet Brands knew about the rape scheme but 
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failed to warn website users of the risks.237 Internet Brands had moved to dismiss 
her claims as barred by the CDA, and the district court granted its motion.238 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.239 
In holding for Doe, the court concluded that the CDA did not shield Internet 
Brands from negligence liability because Doe did not seek to hold it liable as the 
“publisher or speaker” of any particular content.240 Instead, Doe alleged that the 
Internet Brands had a duty to warn users of the dangers of the rape scheme, a duty 
it could have fulfilled by posting a notice on the Model Mayhem website.241  The 
court reasoned that an “alleged tort based on a duty that would require such a self-
produced warning falls outside of” the protections of the CDA.242 In so holding, 
the court noted that its conclusion was consistent with one of the CDA’s core 
policies, “to provide ‘[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material.’” Given that purpose, it stated, “a website should be able to act 
as a ‘Good Samaritan’ to self-regulate offensive third party content without fear of 
liability.”243  In light of the court’s ruling on Doe’s negligence claim, the court did 
more than allow a website to act as a Good Samaritan; it also suggested the 
possibility that the website has a duty to warn once a provider knows or should 
have known of a likely danger to users. 
There are many ways for a website to know of such potential dangers. Most 
social media companies have established a method by which people can alert the 
company to potentially dangerous or inappropriate content.244 Future plaintiffs 
using this case as precedent might argue that once a website is on notice of likely 
potential harm, its duty to warn under state negligence laws may be triggered. 
After concluding that the CDA did not bar Doe’s claims, the court in Internet 
Brands dismissed the claim that its holding might have an impermissible chilling 
effect on online speech.  It noted that the CDA does not provide a general shield 
against liability for online service providers. “Congress has not provided an all-
purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on the 
internet, though any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on internet 
publishing businesses.” By articulating some of the CDA’s limitations, this case 
illuminates the possibility that users might hold websites more accountable for the 
harms they knowingly, or negligently, facilitate. 
Social media companies may be compelled to remove images when their 
rightful owners can establish that their copyright has been violated. As one 
observer noted, however, “using copyright law to combat revenge porn is a bit 
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like using tax law to go after Al Capone.”245 Another option would be the 
establishment of maximum response times to user allegations of tortious content. 
As noted above, most social media companies have established a method by which 
people can alert the company to potentially dangerous or inappropriate content.246 
Whether and when the companies respond to such alerts, however, is up to them.  
Social media companies might voluntarily institute time limits by which they 
ensure a detailed written response to user alerts, possibly including a statement as 
to what, if any, actions were taken as a consequence of the alert.  Alternatively, 
states or the Federal Communications Commission might compel social media 
companies to institute both the alert service and a maximum response time. 
In light of the many benefits of online anonymity, it would be unwise as a 
matter of policy and likely impossible as a matter of law to do away with it 
entirely.  That said, the increasing danger of online harassment, stalking, and other 
potentially serious harms underscore the need to revisit the issue of whether social 
media companies and ISPs should be legally required to make it easier for abusive 
posters to be unmasked. 
D. Reforms Should Ensure That Perpetrators Account For Their Actions 
ICPs should not have sole responsibility for curbing nonconsensual porn 
simply because they can police it more effectively than the legal system alone. One 
danger of shifting too much responsibility to ICPs for nonconsensual porn, or any 
other social ill, is that it risks attributing too little responsibility to the individual 
perpetrators themselves. Ultimately, it should be the people who post 
nonconsensual porn who are the focus of educational, social and regulatory 
reforms. No comprehensive program to stem the spread of nonconsensual porn 
should in effect absolve the people who choose to post nonconsensual private 
images of other people on the internet, as it is those individual decisions to post 
that create the harm in the first place. 
Clearer legal definitions of nonconsensual porn and its consequences are 
necessary to effect a better balance between the rights of nonconsensual porn 
victims and accused perpetrators without unduly burdening ICPs. A significant 
part of the solution, however, lies beyond what legal reforms can accomplish, and 
may include broader educational efforts to emphasize the wrongs and harms of 
nonconsensual porn as well as public service announcements and other non-legal 
strategies. In light of the prevalence of nonconsensual porn, the legal and cultural 
permissiveness about anonymity online in the U.S., and the limitations that such 
permissiveness places on even well intentioned regulatory reform, focusing on the 
individual posters alone is unlikely to be effective at least in the short term.  
Recalibrating our standards of anonymity for nonconsensual porn victims in both 
civil and criminal cases, and reassessing the extent to which ICPs should be liable 
for nonconsensual porn that they know or should know they are hosting and 
promulgating, is the best next step towards eliminating nonconsensual porn. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The sharp rise and high cost of nonconsensual porn impose a significant 
burden on members of society who are already on the political margins.  They 
demand a qualitative change in our legislative and technological responses to this 
form of online speech.  The lack of coherent state regulation of nonconsensual 
porn, despite its recent growth, underscores the need for greater protection of the 
identities of nonconsensual porn victims.  So too does the lack of anonymity 
provisions in the IPPA and earlier efforts to regulate nonconsensual porn at the 
federal level. At the same time, legal protections of internet service providers and 
social media companies do too much to shield online perpetrators and too little to 
allow victims of anonymous harassment to justice. 
Traditional assumptions about and arguments in favor of victim 
identification and online anonymity may, in the context of nonconsensual porn, 
be superseded by the necessity of technological and employment practice 
developments that flip those values. A comprehensive improvement in access to 
justice for nonconsensual porn victims would permit both more pseudonymity for 
victims and less anonymity for alleged offenders.  It should be more difficult for 
anonymous online harassers to remain anonymous and it should be easier for their 
victims to sue as anonymous plaintiffs.  In addition, ICPs should be compelled to 
do more to uncover and deter anonymous online harassment using the same tools 
and collaborative techniques they already use to fight terrorism. As the spread and 
damages of nonconsensual porn have changed, the public and private response to 
such harassment should change as well in order to provide greater protection to 
the most marginalized victims. If there is a right to anonymous speech online, that 
right should be superseded by the right to safely bring an alleged nonconsensual 
porn poster to justice. 
While ICPs have begun to change their practices regarding nonconsensual 
porn posting, more must be done. It is only when the structures that facilitate the 
rise of nonconsensual porn are required to stem that spread, and when its victims 
are confident in the protections afforded by the legal system, that the intent behind 
the rising regulation of nonconsensual porn truly can be put into effect. 
 
